

Naval War College Review

Volume 47
Number 4 *Autumn*

Article 25

1994

The National Guard and National Defense: The Mobilization of the Guard in World War II

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Recommended Citation

Trogdon, Gary A. and Sligh, Robert B. (1994) "The National Guard and National Defense: The Mobilization of the Guard in World War II," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 47 : No. 4 , Article 25.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol47/iss4/25>

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138 Naval War College Review

Grover argues that the Japanese bombing of the American gunboat, often termed a "prelude to war," was the consequence of error, just as Tokyo claimed then and after the Pacific War. The mistake was not misidentification of *Panay* but rather the presumption that the Standard Vacuum merchant vessels it was convoying were carrying Chinese troops. It was the merchant fleet, not its American naval protector, that was precisely the sort of target on which highly motivated Japanese naval aviators hoped to hone their bombing and strafing skills.

That argument, like several others which Grover advances, struck this reviewer as suggestive but incomplete. Despite his extensive archival research and interviews, he marshalls few details on civil-naval frictions or Japanese actions to support it. Strikingly little is said about the nature of the revolution and the subsequent Nationalist-Communist struggles in China that made the Yangtze so dangerous a place for both merchant mariners and the U.S. Navy.

Grover serves up a rich diet of anecdotes rather than a careful analysis of what was going on. One can savor his "sea stories" and usefully digest the snippets of data he offers about ships, captains, and companies. But serious readers will leave this book hungry for a fuller portrait of American lives on the Yangtze and a more thorough analysis of the policies that put them there.

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Sligh, Robert B. *The National Guard and National Defense: The Mobilization of the Guard in World War II*. New York: Praeger, 1992. 208pp. \$45

Robert Sligh is a historian at the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force at Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas. This book is the culmination of a manuscript prepared during his advanced academic program at Texas A & M University. Although he is not an established historian, Sligh's use of sources lends credibility to this work. It is a well documented study and easy to read.

As a means of eliminating the requirement to raise, arm, and pay large standing armies, governments have utilized the citizen-soldier concept. The strengths and weaknesses of such a system are well known. In this excellent historical study of America's National Guard, Robert Sligh has provided an in-depth look at the development and transition of the Guard prior to America's participation in the Second World War.

Sligh briefly describes the Guard's transition from the militia of the founding fathers, its virtual collapse after the Civil War, and the development in 1879 of the National Guard Association (NGA). Not satisfied with its constabulary role, the NGA fought to establish the Guard in the national defense structure and secured congressional appropriations to help prepare it to assume this role. However, this increase in responsibility and funding did not mean that the Guard wanted more supervision or for control to be passed on to Congress or the War Department. The dilemma between the states'

desire for increased federal funding while retaining control of the Guard created several problems during mobilization in 1940–1941. It would be 1990 before the Supreme Court would resolve this dilemma.

The one major flaw in this work occurs in the last pages. After carefully documenting the salient factors affecting the Guard's mobilization during a two-year period, Sligh attempts to explain the remaining history of the Guard in only six pages. There are only one or two paragraphs covering the Cold War, Korea, Vietnam, and their intervening periods; they do not add to this study but only confuse the reader as to what the author's main thesis actually is.

With this one exception, however, this work will be of use to force planners and the national security community. It is a highly specialized work and fills a void in the history of the National Guard.

GARY A. TROGDON
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Davis, Kenneth C. *FDR: Into the Storm, 1937–1940: A History*. New York: Random House, 1993. 691pp. (No price given)

We tend to think of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as the great president who almost singlehandedly brought America back from the depths of despair during the Depression, or as the triumphant commander in chief who successfully led the country through World War II. What we forget is that Franklin Roosevelt was also an often ineffective politician who was unable to get his

policy objectives implemented, particularly during his second term.

Although part of a larger work (this book is the fourth in a projected five-volume biography of FDR), it stands alone. It covers those years when, for various reasons, FDR was less than effective in a variety of areas.

Davis starts by posing the question of how the seemingly invincible winner of the 1936 landslide could, by the end of 1937, be considered by many to have lost his political potency. He argues that hubris regarding the Supreme Court "packing" plan (which was unexpectedly and strongly opposed by many who were otherwise political allies) caused FDR to persist for an unreasonably long time in the unsuccessful attempt to force it through an unwilling Congress. The passions within his own party created by that fight cost him the leverage needed to get other cherished initiatives enacted. (There is an interesting parallel here with current politics regarding the cascading effect of a major policy error early in a term.) FDR further exacerbated his problems by campaigning vigorously in the 1938 primaries against those Democrats who had opposed him on the Court plan. When he almost wholly failed in his purge attempts, his relations with Congress were further strained. Economically, Roosevelt made a number of policy decisions which significantly aggravated the 1937–1938 recession, driving unemployment up and further reducing his effectiveness.

Davis argues that these considerations affected more than just domestic policy but were a marked factor in FDR's less than stirring performance in